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THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND THE
TREATY-MAKING POWER
GENERAL AND H STORICAL CON5IDERATIONS 1
The typical American layman seems content to take the
treaty-making power for granted. He knows little of the actual
operation of the system-whether of the modes of procedure or
of the forces and influences which may be brought to bear apon
it by those outside, as well as within, the constitutional departments and agencies vested with the power of negotiating, approving, ratifyingi and carrying into effect this nation's international
agreements. Nor does the utilitarian layman often express
desire to learn more of the system.
As a matter of fact, the treaty-making power constitutes a
subject which is quite apart from the things of most immediate
concern to him. He evinces much more interest in the results
likely to be brought about by the terms of a given treatywhether it be the acquisition of rights making possible a Panama
Canal, or the entrance of this country into the Ibeague of Nations
-than in the actual modes of procedure and the forces at work
which give the treaty to the nation.
Upon no more than a cursory examination of the treatymaking process, however, interesting constitutional questions
come to the surface which challenge analysis and research. In a
larger sense, the questions suggested should prove of general
interest to followers of constitutional law who are interested in
raising the lid and looking beneath the obvious presumptions
and commonly accepted premises relative to the treaty power.
CERTAI

'The Constitution of the United States provides that:
"He (the President) shall have power, by and with the advice and

consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two-thirds of the
Senators present concur.

.

.

."

(Art. II, Sec. 2).

..

. All treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
authority of the United States, shall be the supreme laWv of the land.
*

.

."

(Art. VI, CI. 2).

"All bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments
as on other bills. . . ." (Art. I, Sec. 7).
"No money shall be drawn from the treasury, but in consequence
of appropriations made by law. . . ." (Art. I, Sec. 9).
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The purpose of the present study is indicated by the title.
The writer attempts to determine the extent to which the treatymaking power is influenced by the House of Representativesan agency which is not included in the constitutional plan provided for the negotiation, approval, and ratification of treaties.
But when the subject is surveyed from the angle of the House
of Representatives, several questions are likely to arise in the
reader's mind. Although the House is excluded from the formal
procedur6 of treaty-making, does that body, under the -Constitution, have any powers by which it can influence the making and
enforcement of treaties? May the so-called lower house of. the
national legislature, as a matter of constitutional right, claim
a share-be it major or minor--of this pretentious authority?
What restraining powers, if any, are at the disposal of this body
to be employed against the Executive as he launches upon treaty
negotiations, or after the completed agreement is presented Lo
the Senate for its "advice and consent" 7 Is the House constitutlonally or morally bound to vote, and must it waive its own
scruples and desires in voting, appropriations provided for in
treaties, or may that body be governed by its own discretion as
to the necessity of approving such expenditures? These and
other inquiries might be made, and, although now the answers
to some have become comparatively simple due to some one hundred-thirty years of precedent, evolution, and tradition, yet as
regards others, the results are by no means so uniform and well
settled. 2
The power to make treaties under the Articles of Confederation (1781-1789), in the absence of a separate executive, was
lodged in the unicameral Congress. Article IX of the Articles
2Those wishing to investigate the general subject of the treatymaking power should consult the Library of Congress compilation, List
of References on the Treaty-Making Power, (1920). Certain valuable
secondary accounts are available, the best known being Charles Henry
Butler's Treaty-Making Power of the United States, 2 Vols., (1902);
Samuel B. Prandall's Treaties, Their Making and Enforcement, 2nd
Edition (1916); Robert T. Devlin's The Treaty Power Under the Constitution of the United States, (1908); Henry St. George Tucker's
Limitations on the Treaty-Making Power under the Constitution of the
United States (1915); and Charles Burns' The Treaty-Making Power of
the United States and the Methods of Its Enforcement as Affecting the
Police Power of the States (1912).
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provided, under certain enumerated conditions as to commercial treaties, that:
The United States In Congress assembled, shall have the sole
and
exclusive right and power of

alliances .

entering into treaties and

..

The United States in Congress assembled shall never. . . .

enter into any treaties or alliances

.

.

. unless nine States assent

to the same.

The Articles also provided 3 that the states should not, without the consent of Congress, enter into treaties, either among
themselves or with foreign nations. The experience of the Confederate Congress indicated only too forcibly that a large legislative assembly, acting alone, leaves much to be desired in the
skillful management of foreign affairs, and, in the light of this
experience, the Constitutional Convention of 1787 resolved that
a radical change must be effected in the manner of direction of
international relations, including, of course, the treaty-making
power.
Although it was quite generally agreed in the Federal Convention that the Executive should assume the lead in the treatymaking process, a difference of opinion developed as to the kind
and degree of legislative check that should be imposed. The
Randolph Resolutions, embodying the so-called Virginia or
"Large State" plan of government, did not include a clause relating to treaty-making. 4 Likewise, in. the Paterson Resolutions
nothing was said as to the manner in which treaties were to be
effected, but inasmuch as the Paterson plan was contingent upon
the retention of the Articles of Confederation, it may be assumed
that the congressional mode of control was to be retained.5
Pinckney went farther, however, and in his draft of a constitution proposed that the Senate should have "the sole and exclusive" power to make treaties.6
Alexander Hamilton's scheme of a constitution for the government of the United. States was the only one of the four submitted plans to include the fundamental proposition of cooperation between the executive and legislative departments in the
' Article VI.
'Madison's Papers (Gilpin Edition), 11:731-35.
'See the Documentary History of the Constitution of the United
States of America, I:322-26.
'Madison's Papers, 11:742. Compare, also, Documentary History
of the Constitution, 1: 317.
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treaty-making process-the idea that was eventually agreed to
by the Convention.7 Article 4 of Hamilton's scheme proposed
that the "Supreme Executive Authority" be vested in a Governor, who was to have as one of his "authorities and functions"
the power of making all treaties "with the advice and approbation of the Senate." s Article 6 went on to provide that the
Senate was to have "the power of advising and approving all
treaties." 9 This, with the exception of the two-thirds vote provision, was substantially the plan which was eventually adopted,
although in different language. Whether or not Hamilton
is to be credited with the authorship of the idea, the writer has
not been able to ascertain.
In the course of the Convention debate on the make-up of
the treaty-making power, a small minority group, including,
among others, such delegates as Mercer, Dickinson, Gouverneur
Morris, and James Wilson, favored a check by the entire legislature rather than by the Senate alone. The principal argument
of this small group was that since treaties under the Constitution
were to operate as laws, they should also have the sanction of
laws, which could be given, not by the Senate acting alone, but
by the whole legislative body. Delegate Mercer, for example,
suggested that the power to make treaties belonged to the executive department and ought not to be final "so as to alt~r the laws
of the land, till ratified by legislative authority." Procedure
in Great Britain was cited as an example in an effort to drive
the point home.'Gouverneur Morris wished to impose a strong legislative
brake upon the treaty-making power, and proposed an amendment to the effect that "no treaty shall be binding on the United
States which is not ratified by law." "The more difficulty in
making treaties," suggested Morris, "the more value will be set
on them."" Madison "suggested the inconvenience of requiring a legal ratification of treaties of alliance, for the purpose of
'For a copy of Col. Hamilton's plan see Documentary History of
the Constitution, 1: 327-28; also Madison's Papers, 11:891.
5Documentary History of the Constitution, 1:327.
'Ibid., p. 328.
"'Madison's Papers, 111:1331-32.
11
Madison's Papers, III:1412613; also Documentary History of the
Constitution, 1:150.
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war, etc.," 12 but James Wilson replied that without a check such
as that proposed by the Morris amendment, he should fear the
power of the Senate. 13 MAr. Dickinson favored ratification by
law as "most safe and proper, though he was sensible it was iufavorable to the little states, which would otherwise have an
equal share in making treaties.'14
Mr. Madison next attempted a compromise on the question
by asking whether a "distinction might not be made between
different sorts of treaties; allowing the President and Senate to
make treaties eventual, and of alliance for limited terms, and
requiring the concurrence of the whole Legislature in other
treaties." 15 Later in the Convention, James Wilson, still giving
voice to his preference for participation by the entire legislature
in the treaty-making process, moved to amend the treaty article
to read, "by and with the advice and consent of the Senate and
House of Represlntatives."' 6 Wilson pleaded that since treaties
under the Constitution were to operate as laws, they should also
have the sanction of laws. He recognized the validity of the
objection that the entire Congress might not be a fit repository
for diplomatic secrets connected with treaty negotiations, but so
far as the two things were mutually contradictory and inconsistent, he thought the necessity for secrecy was outweighed by
the urgency of a legislative sanction. 7 Delegate Williamson
rose to express his fear of the possibility that, if treaties were
made in the Senate alone, they might be made by a majority of
the States without a majority of the people. Eight men, he suggested, might be the majority of a quorum!' s Mr. Sherman
opposed "leaving the rights established by the treaty of peace,
to the Senate; and moved to annex a proviso, that no such rights3
should be ceded without the sanction of the Legislature." 9
The debates and votes in the Convention show, however, that
the body was overwhelmingly opposed to the proposal for admitting the House of Representatives to a direct place in the treatyMadison's Papers, 111:1412-14.
0 Ibid.

14

Ibid.

Madison's Papers, 111:1415.
" Ibid., pp. 1518-19. See also Documentary History of the Constitution,
1:188-89.
17
Madison's Papers, 111:1518-19.
"Madison's Papers, 1II: 1526.
Ibid.
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making power, and when, late in the Convention, the Constitution, in practically its final form, was presented, Article II, Section 2 provided that "He (the President) shall have power, by
and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties,
. "20
providing two-thirds of the Senators present concur.
The uneven contest was not yet ended, however, for the
question of House participation in the treaty power was destined
to break out afresh in several of the state ratifying conventions.
One of the most interesting of those state contests occurred in
Pennsylvania, where the minority submitted a report in which
stress was laid upon the extent and scope of the treaty-making
power. The minority criticized the non-participation of the
House of Representatives, the popular and national branch of
the legislature, in treaty-making, and suggested that a treaty,
if contrary to a law of Congress, should not be valid until such
law had been repealed or had been made conformable to the
treaty. The following amendment to Article VI, Clause 221 was
proposed :22
Provided always that no treaty, which shall hereafter be made,
shall be deemed or construed to alter or affect any law of the United
States, or of any particular state, until such treaty shall have been laid
before and assented to by the House of Representatives in Congress.

In the Virginia convention, Patrick Henry, as was to have
been expected, attacked the power of making treaties as "ill.
guarded. "23 George Mason, after reiterating Henry's contention that the power was not sufficiently guarded, argued that the
treaty process required more solemnity and caution. Treaties
should be made only in cases of "most urgent and unavoidable
necessity," and since certain treaties might be used to "dismember the empire," such agreements should require the consent of
three-fourths of both branches of the Congress. 24 Although the
2"Documentary History of the Constitution, 1:362-85.

'The "supreme law clause."
"Jonathan Elliot, Debates on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution, 11:542-46; the amendment is at p. 546. See also Butler,
Treaty-Making Power of the United States, I: 341-43.
23Elliot's Debates, 111:500.
2 Elliot's
Debates, 111:508-09. In another connection, Mason
argued in his oft-quoted objections that "By declaring all treaties
supreme laws of the land, the Executive and the Senate.have, in many
cases, an exclusive power of legislation, which might have been avoided,
by proper distinctions with respect to treaties, and requiring the assent
of the House of Representatives, where it could be ddne with safety."

Elliot's Debates, 1:495.
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Constitution was ratified, the Virginia convention proposed the
following amendment as a limitation upon the treaty-making
power :25
That . . . no treaty ceding, contracting, restraining or suspending the territorial rights or claims of the United States or any of them
or their, or any of their rights or claims to fishing in the American
seas, or navigating the American rivers shall . . . be ratified without the concurreucd of three-fourths of the whole number of the members of both houses respectively.

The following proposed amendment was offered in the convention in North Carolina :26
That no treaties which shall be directly opposed to the existing
laws of the United States in Congress assembled shall be valid until
such laws shall be repealed, or made conformable to such treaty; nor
shall any treaty be valid which is contradictory to the Constitution of
the United States.

Regardless of the number of similar amendments proposed,
nothing concrete came from these overtures looking toward the
inclusion of the House of Representatives in the treaty power.
Hamilton and Jay, in writing the Federalist, took occasion
to uphold the treaty provisions of Article II, Section 2. As regards the negotiation of treaties, Jay suggested that there doubtless were many persons "who would rely on the secrecy of the
President, but who would not confide in that of the Senate, and
still less in that of a large popular Assembly." Jay then went on
to refute the contentions of those who held that, since treaties
were to have the force of laws, "they should be made only by
men invested with legislative authority." "It surely does not
follow," contended Jay, "that because they have given the
power of making laws to the Legislature, that therefore they
should likewise give them power to do every other act of sovereignty by which the citizens are to be bound and affected !',27
Little did Jay realize that within seven years from the time of
the expression of these sentiments he would be wildly criticized
and burned in effigy for a part which he was destined to play in
connection with the treaty-making power, and that the treaty,
which was to bear his name and was to be in large part the product of his own'mind and hand, would be the spark which would
5Ibid., 111:660; also Documentary History of the Constitution,
11:382.
Elliots Debates, IV:246.
"The Federalist (Ford's Edition), No. 64, pp. 429, 431.
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set off one of the greatest constitutional debates in the early history of our government.
Hamilton's opinions on this particular phase of the treatymaking power are so well known and have been so often quoted
that they are best expressed in his own words:28
"The remarks made in a former number . . . will apply with
conclusive force against the admission of the House -f Representatives
to a share in the formation of treaties. The fluctuating, and, taking
its future increase into account, the multitudinous composition of that
body, forbid us to expect in it those qualities -which are essential to the
proper execution of such a trust. Accurate and comprehensive knowledge of foreign politics; a steady and systematic adherence to the
same views; a nice and uniform sensibility to National character; decision, secrecy, and dispatch are incompatible with the genius of a
body so variable and so numerous. The very complication of the business, by introducing a necessity of the concurrence of so many differ
ent bodies, would of itself afford a solid objection. The greater frequency of the calls upon the House of Representatives, and the greater
length of time which it would often be necessary to keep them together
when convened, to obtain their sanction in the progressive stages of a
treaty, would be the source of so great inconvenience and expense, as

alone ought to condemn the project."

In these earlier jousts on the question of the non-participation of the House of Representatives n the treaty-making power,
it should be emphasized that the two questions which in later
constitutional history were to form the core around which mdjor
congressional debates have centered, seem not to have been seriously debated if, in fact, they were more than casually mentioned. These two questions are: (1) When a request for treaty
papers, ministerial instructions, or other diplomatic information
issues from the House of Representatives, is the Ohief Executive
under any obligation to accede to said request? and (2) Is the
House of Representatives constitutionally or morally bound to
vote the appropriations provided for in treaties negotiated by
the President and the Senate, or may that body be governed by
its own discretion as to the necessity of approving such expenditures? These two major propositions seem largely to have been
lost sight of in the controversy concerning the direct participation of the lower house in the treaty-making process.
The House debate in 1796 concerning the treaty with Great
Britain, commonly known as the Jay Treaty, constituted the
earliest important constitutional landmark as to the meaning

0 The Federalist

(Ford's Edition), No. 75, pp. 502-03.

224
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and application of Article II,Section 2-at a time when precedents were being formed and governmental principles defined
and allocated. The treaty embodied in its provision certain
agreements which called for the appropriation of sizeable sums
of money before the contracts could be carried into effect, and
it was with these provisions in mind that Washington submitted
a copy of -the compact to the House of Representatives for its
information. 29 This "remarkable cotitest" grew out of the request by the House to the Executive for certain papers used in
connection with the negotiations, on the grounds that the treaty
dealt with subjects which were, by the Constitution, placed in
the control of the legislative branch of the government, and that
if the House was expected to vote the appropriations necessary
to carry the treaty into effect, it had a perfect right to ask for
the papers for purposes of information.
During the progress of the debate, Representative Baldwin
saw nothing unusual in asking for the papers inasmuch as the
President had taken the initiative in sending a copy of the treaty
to the Hohse. He dwelt on the desirability of publicity in treaty
negotiations and argued that it would be unfair for the House
to take up the subject of the treaty "naked and unexplained. " 30
Mir. Gallatin interpreted the question before the House as being,
",Did the House have any discretionary power in regard to the
Treaty l" There could be no harm in asking for the infbrmation and some good might come from it, he cbntended. 31 The
question which James Madison saw thrown before the House by
the resolution was, "Does the general power of making treaties
supersede the powers of the House of Representatives, particularly specified in the Constitution, so as to take to the Executive
all deliberative will, and leave the House only an executive and
ministerial instrumental agency ?''32
Representative Gallatin made one of the best reasoned arguments delivered during the course of the debate on the House
resolution. It was his opinion "that the House had a right to
ask for the papers proposed to be called for, because their cooperation and sanction were necessary to carry the Treaty into
"Annals of Congress, V, (4th Cong., 1st Sess.), p. 394.
Ibid., pp. 435-36.
Annals, V: 436-37.
Ibld. pp. 437-38.

THE H6usE;

AND THE

TREATY-MAKING PoW:E

full effect, to render it a binding instrument, and to make it,
properly speaking, a law of the land; because they had a full
discretion either to give or to refuse that cooperation; because
they must be guided, in the exercise of that discretion, by the
merits and expediency of the Treaty itself, and therefore had
a right to ask for every information which could assist them in
deciding that question." If a treaty deals with subjects which
are, by the Cbnstitution, placed in the hands of the legislative
branch of the government, -the sanction of that branch is necessary before the treaty properly becomes the law of the land. "In
this case, and to this end, the Legislature have a right todemand
the documents relative to the negotiation of the Treaty, because
that Treaty operates on objects especially delegated to the Legislature." The power to make treaties, Gallatin contended, is
limited by other parts of the Constitution, and, to be specific,
the power of the President and Senate to provide for appropriations of money through the agency of the treaty-making process
is limited by the congressional control of the purse.88
Mr. Madison presented a logical and studied contention
M
against the encroachment of the treaty-making power on the prerogatives of the Legislature. The House should be careful, he
asserted, to avoid intrusions on the 'powers of the other departments, but it should also be alert to guard its own powers agaipst
aggression. He held it to be important and decisive that "if the
Treaty power alone could perform any one act for which the
authority of Congress is required by the Constitution, it may
perform every act for which the authority of that part of the
Government is required." As regards the power of the purse,
the Treaty power could not be considered as paramount to that
of Congress. Ours is a Government of checks and balances, and
it is not unreasonable "to leantowards a construction that would
limit and control the Treaty-making power, rather than towards
one that would make it omnipotent." The latter construction
Madison held to be "utterly inadmissible." Legislation implies
deliberation, and if the House were obliged to carry all treaties
into, effect without question and without deliberation, the legislative authority would become nothing more than an empty
. Annals, V:464-74.
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name. The Legislature would become the mere instrument of
3
another power and would have no will of its own. 4
President Washington was firm, however, in his refusal to
accede to the request of the House.3 5 He pointed out that the
"nature of foreign negotiations required caution," with their
success often depending upon secrecy. A full disclosure of all
the elements entering into treaty negotiations would be "extremely impolitic," with the resulting possibility of "pernicious
a right
.
influence on future negotiation." "To admit .
in the House of Representatives to demand, and to have, as a
matter of course, all the papers respecting a negotiation with a
foreign power, would be to establish a dangerous precedent."
The President argued that the only valid purpose for which the
House might ask for an inspection of the papers was for the
determination of impeachment-a purpose which the House
resolution had not expressed.
The power of making treaties, asserted the Chief Executive,
is vested exclusively in the President and the Senate, and every
treaty "so made, and promulgated, thenceforward becomes the
law of the land." Former Houses had *acquiesced in this position and heretofore had "made all the requisite provisions" for
carrying treaties into effect. This construction and practice coincided with the agreements reached, not only in the Federal 'Convention of 1787 but in the state ratifying conventions as well,
and it was pointed out that the proposal to make the binding
force of treaties contingent upon ratification by law had been
rejected by the Philadelphia Convention.
Upon Washington's refusal to accede to the request of the
lower branch, the House, after long debate, agreed by an extremely close vote to the passage of the requisite appropriations,
but not until after it had expressed its views on the subject in
clear and unmistakable language by the passage of the so-called
Blount Resolutions, as follows :86
Resolved, That, it being declared by the second section of the second
article of the Constitution, "that the President shall have power, by and
with the advice of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two-thirds of
the Senate present concur," the House of .Representatives do not claim
any agency in making Treaties; but, that when a Treaty stipulates
Annals, V . 487-95.
8 Ibid., pp. 760-62.

' Annals, V:771-72.

Passed by vote of 57-35.

Ibid., pp. 782-83.
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regulations on any of the subjects submitted by the Constitution to the
power of Congress, it must depend for its execution, as to such. stipula,
tions, on a law or laws to be passed by Congress. And-it is- the constitutional right and duty of the House of. Representatives, in all such
cases, to deliberate on the expediency or inexpediency of carrying such
Treaty into effect, and to determine and, act thereon, as, in their Judgment, may be most conducive to the public good.
Resolved, That it is not necessary to the propriety of any applies,
tion from this House, to the Executive, for information desired by them,
and which may relate to any constitutional fu~ictlons of the House,
that the purpose for which such information may be'.wanted, or to
which the same may be applied, should be stated in the application.

The importance of the Blount Resolutions, which have never
been f6rmally relinquished, 37 cannot be overemphasized, for in
them the House, although giving up all claim to a place in the
actual negotiation and ratification of treaties, definitely reserved
to itself the right to petition the President on treaty matters by
means of resolution, and, what is infinitely more important, the
right to exercise its discretion on the expediency of granting appropriations necessary to carily treaties into effect. 38

Further-"

more, it was frequently contended during the course of the Jay

Treaty debate, .and the position has subsequently been regularly
upheld by the courts,39 that until Congress sees fit to approv=Allen Johnson, Readings in American Constitutional History,
1776-1876, p. 197.
'Herman
W. Morris, writing in 37 American Law Review
363-80, in an article entitled,- "The Power of Congress over Treaties,"
states, at p. 369, that the controversy over the Jay Treaty "ended in
nothing practical. The House did not even define its views in any
formal resolutions." In view of the passage of the Blount Resolutions,
such an assertion must, it would seem, fall to the ground.
"It would be valuable in this connection to follow through the decisions of the courts on thip matter, (a study which comprises the latter
part of this article, particularly the leading constitutional ceses
of Foster v. Neilson (1829), 2 Peters 253; Turner v. American Raptist
MissionaryUnion (1852), 24 Fed. 344; Taylor v. Morton (1855), 23 Fed.
784; United States v. Tobacco Factory (1870), 28 Fed. 195, also 11 Wall.
616; Ropes et al. v. Olinch (1871), 20 Fed. 1171; La Abra Silver Mining
Co. v. United States (1899), 175 U. S. 423; etc. The general doctrine
laid down by the courts in these cases is that Congress has the power
to refuse to provide appropriations for carrying a treaty into effect, at
its discretion, and, although such a treaty, when ratified and promulgated, becomes the "supreme law of the land," yet the enforcement remains dormant until Congress shall see fit to provide the necessary
funds. This holding, of course, does not apply to self-executing treaties,
that Is, those which require no appropriation before they can be carried
into qffect. The courts have also held that since laws and treaties,
both being the "supreme law of the land," are placed on the same constitutional plane, the later one in point of time will be enforced in case
of conflict, . . . be it law or treaty . . .
and hence Congress
has the power by law to violate or to abrogate a treaty, although at the
risk of condemnation by the other party or parties to the compact.
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priate such moneys as are necessary to carry treaty provisions
into effect, those provisions, although normally held to be the
'supreme law of the land," remain ineffectual and inoperative 40
until appropriations have been made to give them life and
strength. "Thus ended," says Butler, 'the first of the great
parliamentary battles fought by the House of Representatives
to gain control of the treaty-making power of the United
States.' '41
The Jay Treaty contest r.elative to the proper relation of
the House of Representatives to the treaty-making power was
only the first of a series of similar contests which have reculTed
at intervals from 1796 to the present day. 42 And in practically
all of the succeeding contests, the positions set forth and the contentions presented show a striking similarity to those enunciated
in the Jay controversy.
The question that frequently recurs is: "Has the House of
Representatives the right to withhold its consent to a bill for putting a treaty into effect, and to thereby defeat it ? Or, in another
form: What is the nature of the obligation which rests on the
House of Representatives to give validity to a treaty which has
1 At least so far as the United States, as one of the parties to the
treaty, is internally or municipally concerned.
4 Butler, op. cit., 1:429. Butler claims that the result of the Jay
Treaty controversy was a "distinct victory for the Executive," in that
Washington refused to comply with the request of the House and managed" to uphold his position, thereby denying to the House a definite
niche in the treaty-making process. On the other hand, H. S. G. Tucker
contends that Butler's contention cannot be upheld, and he goes into
subsequent history for examples with which to prove his case. Tucker's
thesis is that Presidents have learned a lesson from the Jay controversy, and he runs the gauntlet of the Presidents showing how they
have, in turn, carefully handled the House in an attempt not to antagonize it so as to jeopardize the chances of obtaining treaty appropritions.
Limitations on the Treaty-Making Power under the Constitution of the
United States, Chapter VIII, "Treaty Power and the House of Representatives," pp. 202-38.
42Some of the more important of these contests have arisen in connection with the Louisiana Purchase treaty of 1803; the commercial
treaty with Great Britain, 1815; the French treaty of 1831; the Alaska
Purchase treaty of 1867; the Mexican commercial treaty of 1883 in
which the House upheld its right to refuse to vote appropriations for a
treaty which, it was held, interfered with the exercise of its constitu-.
tional powers; the Hawaiian reciprocity treaty of 1884; the Colombian
treaty of 1921,

. .

to say nothing of many others.

But in all these

cases, with the single exception noted, even though its right to a discretionary prerogative was uniformly asserted, the House has followed
the precedent set in 1796 and the necessary appropriations have been
voted.
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been formally entered into with a foreign nation by the President, and properly ratified by the'Senate?" 4 With a single
exception, 44 the House has always proceeded on the theory, apparently, that since a treaty is a solemn international contract
and since the United States would no doubt be charged with
having violated its trust as expressed in a sacred international
agreement if the means of execution were denied, it is expedient
for it to forego its own discretion and prerogatives for the sake
of international comity. Nevertheless, inasmuch as the House
has not and doubtless will not relinquish its legal right to exercise its discretion in such matters, it would seem that the prudent Executive will ascertain the sense of the House, when appropriations will be called for by the treaty, before proceeding
upon contemplated negotiations.
From the point of view of one interested in the final deterruination of the matter here under consideration, it is unfortunate that the Treaty of Versailles, including the League of
Nations protocol, was not approved by the United States..Senate.
In view of the highly agitated state of public opinion at the time
on the general subject of the League, and in view of the oftexpressed threat on the part of various representatives that the
House must some day arise and assert its alleged constitutional
prerogatives as regards treaties and treaty-making, it is interesting to contemplate what action, if any, the House would have
taken in the event of the Senate's approval of the treaty. It is
no doubt probable that the House would have concurred in the
-action of the Senate and that the appropriations necessary for
carying the treaty into effect-and, incidentally, of carrying the
United States into the League of Nations-would. have been
forthcoming. On the other hand, to continue the contemplation,
it is by no means beyond the reach of the imagination to suppose
that the House, carrying out an anti-League mandate from the
people at large (presupposing again that such a mandate existed), would have risen to the occasion and, in view of the
momentous issues at stake, would have cast precedent and tra"Chalfant Robinson, "The Treaty-Making Power -of the House of
Representativesr" in 12 Yale Review 191-204. This quotation at p. 191.
"In the case of the commercial treaty with Mexico, 1883. See note
42 above; also Butler, op. cit., 11:478-79; also House Reports, 49th
Cong., lst Sess., (Vol. IX), No. 2615 (1883).

KTUCKY- LAW JOURNAL
difion to the winds and would, have refused to vote the requisite
appropriations, thereby leaving the President, the Senate, andthe treaty high and dry and with little hope of. being able tQ
carry the treaty stipulations into effect.
To recapituilate, it must be said that, despite the bid frequently made by the House of Representatives for a place in the
treaty-making sun, there seems to be no popular demand for a
change in the treaty-making process, at least so far as extending
participation to the lower house is concerned. Proposals have
been made from time to time that, for example, "the requirement of the approval of treaties by a majority of both houses of
Congress would, it would seem, better comport with the desideratum of democratic control of foreign affairs. This is especially
true in view of the highly unequal constituencies from which
.,"45 Although such a change may come
senators spring.
eventually, the firmly entrenched doctrine remains, as summarized by Judge Cooley :46
"Chec, on the Treaty-Making Plower.--The full treaty-making power
is in the President and Senate; but the House of Representatives has a
restraining power upon it in that it may in its discretion at any time
refuse to give assent to legislation necessary to give a treaty effect.
Many treaties need no such legislation; but when moneys are to be paid
by the United States, they can be appropriated by Congress alone; and
in some other cases laws are needful. An unconstitutional or manifestly unwise treaty the House of Representatives may possibly refuse
to aid; and this, when legislation is needful, would be equivalent to a
refusal of the government, through one of its branches, to carry the
treaty into effect. This would be an extreme measure, but it is conceivable that a case might arise in which a resort to it would be justified."

THE CONSTITUTIONAL DmEmmA
No more than a cursory examination of the Constitution will
disclose that, as regards the treaty-making power, there appears
to be what Chalfant Robinson has aptly termed a "costitutional
dilemma." 47 A conflict of authority appears to exist in that
"the field of legislation and the field of diplomacy overlap," and
there exist "the apparently inconsistent and conflicting powers
vested by the Constitution in different branches of the Federal
1 Howard Lee McBain, The Living Constitution, p. 199.
0 Thomas M. Cooley, General Principles of Constitutional Law, (3rd
Edition, McLaughlin, 1898), p. 175.
' "The Treaty-Making Power of the House of Representatives," 12
Yale Review 191-204, (Aug., 1903). This quotation at p. 193.
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government; that is, the general power of legislation on the one
48
hand, and the treaty-making power on the other."
In other words, Congress, by the terms of Article I, Section
8, is given the power to regulate foreign commerce, to declare
war, and "to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises,"
while under the Constitution the grant of power to the treatymaking agencies is in its terms unlimited, unless by implication
and by the application of principles of general constitutional
construction, although Article VI indicates that only treaties
made "under the authority of the United States49 shall be the
supreme law of the land." What is the outcome, therefore,
when the President and the Senate-the constitutional treatymaking power-propose a treaty purporting to regulate foreign
commerce or another to outlaw war, either in a field of action
which, by Article I, Section 8, falls within the jurisdiction of
Congress? Are these congressional grants of power to imply
that the treaty-making power shall not extend to such subjects?
Or, granted that a treaty may be made which, for example, imposes regulations upon foreign commerce, how far may the
President and the Senate proceed without dispossessing Congress of its definite, constitutional control of that subject under
Article I, Section 8 ? No expansion of the legal imagination is
necessary to realize that the questions presented by this 'dilemma
are of fundamental importance, nor is it to be wondered at that
this apparent conflict has led, upon occasion, to mnich jealousy
and friction between the House of Representatives on the one
hand and the President or Senate, or both, on the other.
But there are other aspects of the problem. Many, if not
most, treaties are not self-executing-that is, they cannot be carried into full force and effect on the part of the United States
without certain legislative action, such as the appropriation of
funds provided for by the terms of the agreement itself. When
such appropriations are necessary to give life and strength to
the treaty, may the House of Representatives substantially defeat it by refusing to grant the necessary funds; or is that body
deprived of its discretion in the matter and hence morally, if not
legally, bound by the Constitution and by the provisions of the
18Herman W. Morris, "The Power of Congress Over Treaties," 37

American Law Review, 363, 364, (1903).
"Italics are the writer's.
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solemn, international agreement to provide the required money?
If such discretion be admitted, then is it not true that the House
of Representatives becomes a moving, essential, vital part of the
treaty-making power? The proposition is well put by Mr. Robinson, who declares that "if a treaty made by the President and
the" Senate, as the Constitution provides, requires the action of
the House of Representatives to complete it, so as to make it
valid, then the treaty-making power is not absolute with the
President and the Senate, but is shared in by the House. On
the other hand, if the treaty dealing with the revenues may constrain in advance the consent of the House, then bills of revenue
may originate, elsewhere than in the House of Representatives." 5 0 And, what is more, if a treaty requires an appropriation to give it effectiveness, and remains impotent and lifeless
withou't such action, which, according to Article VI, is in reality
the "supreme law of the land'"--the treaty "made under the
authority of the United States" or the congressional act of
appropriation?
The House of Representatives has contended, quite naturally, that when a treaty deals with the regulation of foreign
commerce, the adjustment of import duties, or, in short, with
any subject the control of which is given by the Constitution to
Congress, the House retains the right to refuse assent to the
treaty by withholding appropriations or other legislation necessary to carry the treaty into full force and effect. 51
On the other hand, the President and the Senate-the constitutional treaty-making power-have asserted that when a
treaty has been negotiated, approved by the Senate, ratified, and
ratifications exdhanged, it becomes the "supreme law of the
land," and hence binding, not only upon the nation, individuals,
and the courts, but upon Congress as well.5 2N It therefore folOp. cit., 12 Yale Review, 103.

The attitude of the House was expressed early in the so-called
Blount Resolutions, 1796. Annals of Congress, V:771-72. (4th Congress, 1st session). See also note 36, ante.
U This Is the position taken by President Washington in what is
perhaps the most important of all contests involving the propositions
here under examination

.

.

. the Jay Treaty controversy of 1796.

See Annals of Congress, V:761-62. Charles IH.Burr contends that "the
Presidents of the United States have uniformly supported the view of
Woshington." The Treaty-Making Power of the United States and the
Methods of Its Enforcement as Affecting the Police Powers of the States,
P. 292. (The Crowned Essay for the Henry M. Phillips Prize of $2,000,
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lows from this contention that Congress is under a moral, not to
say constitutional, obligation to take the action necessary to
enable the United States, as one of the contracting parties, to
fulfill the requirements imposed by the treaty; and, further, that
this obligation is so strong as to divest Congress of all discretion
in the matter of providing the necessary legislation.
The House of Representatives has, upon occasion, either
rightly or wrongly, menaced this nation's international obligations under a treaty by threatening not to provide the funds
necessary for its execution. This somewhat distressing arrangement has caused embarrassment to the treaty-making power in
several instances, but it is a situation for which we can hold the
Constitution responsible, as no remedy is expressly provided
therein to meet the difficulties presented by the overlapping
jurisdictions of Congress on the one side and the treaty-making
power on the other.
The limited scope of the present article does not permit of
an examination of the many occasions upon which the propositions presented by the aforementioned "constitutional dilemma"
have been argued in and by the House of Representatives. The
Jay Treaty joust only lighted the way for a series of similar controversies which were to follow in the next century and a quarter.5 3 The Alaska Purchase treaty with Russia, 1867, for exApr. 20, 1912. Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, VoL
51, No. 206, Aug.-Sept., 1912). This position is refuted by Henry St.
George Tucker in his Limitations on the Treaty-Making Power under
the Constitution of the United States, Chap. VIII, pp. 202-38.
The best known of these subsequent controversies occurred in connection with the Louisiana Purchase treaty with France, 1803; the commercial treaty with Great Britain, 1815; a similar treaty with Prussia
and the Germanic Confederation, 1844; the Gadsden Purchase treaty
with Mexico, 1853; the Canadian reciprocity treaty, 1854; the Alaska
Purchase treaty with Russia, 1867; the Hawaiian reciprocity treaty of
1876; the commercial reciprocity convention with Mexico, 1883; the
renewal of the Hawaiian treaty, 1884; and other more recent cases of
greater or less importance.
Occasionally in these contests the Senate has given serious consideration to the contentiong of the House. For example, in connection with the Prussian and Germanic Confederation treaty of 1844,
Senator Rufus Choate presented a report from the Senate Committee
on Foreign Relations in which the rejection of the treaty was urged
on the ground that since the Constitution communicates these powera
to no other agency, "the general rule of our system is, indisputably-,
that the control of trade and the function of taxing belong, without
abridgment or participation, to Congress." The report further urged
that the legislature was more representative of the people, was in a
position to obtain better Information, and would be likely to use Its
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ample, called for an appropriation of -some $7,200,000, and although the najority of the House -was apparently willing to
grant the necessary funds, that body "wished to couple the
approval of the treaty with a reservation of the right of the
House to approve or disapprove iA all cases in which the sanction of the House is necessary to execute a treaty, "5 but following a rebuff from the Senate on this point, the House compromised its views, and the preamble of the act by which the necessary moneys were appropriated mildly supported the House
position as follows :55
"and whereas said stipulations cannot be carried into full force and

effect except by legislation to which the consent of both houses of Congress Is necessary; .

The renewal of the Hawaiian reciprocity treaty of 1876
occurred in 1884, but the question of the advisability of the renewal was not submitted to the 'lower house, and the inevitable
contest followed. But this particular controversy produced one
of the classics in the field of constitutional treaty literature, for
it was at this juncture, 1887, that John Randolph Tucker of
the House Committee on the Judiciary submitted his well known
report concerning the constitutional aspects of the iouse posipower "more intelligently" and "more disreetly" than the Executive
department. Senate Journal, 28th Cong., 1st sess., (1843-1844), 445-48
(June 14, 1844).
The reader who does not care to make a detailed study of these
contests in the Annals of Congress, Congressional Globe, Congressional
Record, and the House Reports, can find brief discussions in Francis
Wharton's Digest of the International Law of the United States, (Second Edition), II: Sees. 131a, f; Charles Henry Butler's Treaty-Making
Power of the United States, I: Sees. 299-309, pp. 43244; Henry St.
George Tucker, op. cit., Chap. VIII, pp. 202-38; Samuel B. Crandall's
Treaties, Their Making and Enforcement, (Second Edition), Chaps.
XII-XV, pp. 164-246; Quincy Wright, "Treaties and the Constitutional
Separation of Powers In the United States," 12 American Journal of
International Law 64-96, (Jan., 1918); and Chalfant Robinson's
article, op. cit., 12 Yale Review 191-204 (Aug., 1903).
'A resolution to this effect passed the lower branch by the overwhelming majority of 113-43, July 14, 1867.
,Wharton's Digest, II:Sec. 131a, pp. 21-22. Charles Pergier holds
that the "moral obligation" upon Congress to provide for the execution
of the terms of an international compact by furnishing the necessary
funds is, "of course, beyond dispute." Quoting Duer's Outlines of Constitutional Jurisprudence of the United States, p. 138, Perger continues
that the payment of funds called for by a treaty "renders it morally
obligatory on Congress to pass the requisite law," and refusals so to
provide constitute a "breach of public faith and afford just cause for
war." "Limitations of the Treaty-Making Power," 98 Central Law Journal 41-45, (Feb. 5, 1925), at p. 44.
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tion,50 in which the power of the President-and Senate to -egotiate a binding treaty "whereby duties on imports are Gobe
without the sanction of an act of Congress"
regulated,
was denied. The President was therefore "requested to withhold final action upon the proposed convention, and to condition
its final ratification upon the sanction of an act of Congress
"257

In 1883 there was concluded with Mexico a commercial reciprocity convention, which, like the Hawaiian treaty of 1876,
contained a provision that it should not take effect "until laws
necessary to carry it into operation shall have been passed both
by the Congress of the United States and the Government of the
",58 This action Congress failed
United Mexican States.
59
had been concluded extendtwo
conventions
to take, and after
ing the time for the enactment of the necessary legislation, the
treaty ceased to be operative on May 20, 1887.0 So far as the
writer has been able to discover, this constitutes the first and
only time in our history that the House successfully proclaimed
and executed its oft-asserted prerogative to exercise discretion
in giving effectiveness to a treaty already concluded, but requiring auxiliary legislation to give it strength and performance. 1
The limitations of this article preclude any extended discussion, except incidentally, of the holdings -of the courts concerning the general scope, extent, and limitations of the treatymaking power, although such holdings necessarily have an important bearing on the contentions expressed by the House of
H "Treaty with the Hawaiian Islands," House Reports, 49th Cong.,
2nd sess., Vol. II, No. 4177 (1886-1887). This report is essential to the
student who would make a thorough study of the constitutional questions relative to the House and the treaty-making power.
51Ibid., p. 23 of the report.
1 24 Stat. at L., 975-89, at p. 988. rThe treaty was approved by the

Senate, ratified by the President, ratifications exchanged, and proclaimed on June 2, 1884.
U See the reports of the Committee on Ways and Means, House
Reports, 49th Cong., 1st sess., Vol. IX, No. 2615 (1885-1886).
'0Butler, op. cit., 11:478-79.
1It is a question whether Chalfant Robinson has not generalized
a bit too freely from this single case when he asserts that the lower
branch "thus determined that treaties dealing with the revenues are altogether under control of the House of Representatives, and that there
is no obligation recognized in like treaties (italics are the writer's) to
follow the action of the Senate by favorable legislation." Op. cit., 12
Yale Review 202. In the light of precedents established both before
and since 1883, the adequate support of such a broad inference might
prove somewhat difficult.
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Representatives that the delegated powers of Congress under
Article I, Section 8, limit the jurisdiction of the treaty-making
agencies.
The United States Supreme Court, speaking through Chief
Justice Taney, h'eid in Holmes v. Jennison 2 that the treatymaking power under the Constitution "was designed to include
,all those subjects, which, in the ordinary intercourse of nations,
had usually been made subjects of negotiation and treaty, and
which are consistent with the nature of our institutions, and the
distribution of powers between the general and state governments."
Perhaps the leading opinion as to the extent and scope of
the treaty-making power is that given by Justice Field in
Geofroy v. Riggs in 1890,63 in which the Court held:
"That the treaty power of the United States extends to all proper
subjects of negotiation between ohr government and the governments
of other nations, is clear. . . . The treaty power, as expressed ir1
the Constitution, is in terms unlimited eccept by those restraints which
are found in that instrument against the action of the government or of
its departments, and those arising from the nature of the government
itself, and of that of the States. It would not be contended that it extends so far as to authorize what the Constitution forbids, or a change
in the character of the government or in that of one of the States, or a
cession of any portion of the territory of the latter, without its consent.
. But with these exceptions, it is not perceived that there is any
limit to the questions which can be adjusted touching any matter which
is properly the subject of negotiations with a foreign country."

'The fundamental question remains, however, whether the
delegated powers of Congress, to employ the language of the
Court, constitute "restraints" which are found in the Constitution "against the action of the government or of its departments,
and those arising from the nature of the government itself
. .." and whether a treaty involving the powers under
Article I, Section 8, operates "to authorize wha' the Constitution
forbids.
"
Calhoun contended that the treaty-making power was "limited by such provisions of the Constitution as direct certain acts
to. be done in a particular way, and which prohibit the contrary,
of which a striking example is to be found in that which declares
that 'no money shall be drawn from the Treasury but in conse2 14 Peters 540, 569.
S133 U. S. 258, 266°67; see also H. S. G. Tucker, op. cit., Chap. L
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quence of appropriations to be made by'law.' " He continues :64
"Thisnot only imposes an important restriction on the power, but
gives to Congress as the law making power, and to the House of 'Representatives as a portion of Congress, the right to withhold appropriations; and, thereby, an important control over the treaty-making power,
whenever money is required to carry a treaty into effect; which Is
usually the case, especially in reference to those of much importance."

It was asserted by Thomas Jefferson that the wording of the
Constitution must have meant to except, as being outaide the
jurisdiction of thp treaty-making power, "those subjects of legislation in which it gave a participation to the, plouse of Representatives." Jefferson acknowledged, however, that this exception was "denied by some on the ground that it would leave very
little matter for the treaty power to work on." 65
Difficulties presented by this "constitutional dilemma"
have also come before the state courts for adjudication. In a
California case, 66 for example, the state supreme court, through
Chief Justice Murray, has given as its opinion that the treatymaking power cannot be extended by the President and the
Senate "to matters which are the proper subject of congressional
legislation; 'for it would,' as Mr. Jefferson truly remarks, in his
letter to Mr. Monroe, in 1796, upon the subject of the British
treaty, 'be virtually transferring the powers of legislation from
the President, Senate and House of Representatives, to the President, Senate and Piamingo, and any other Indian, Algerine or
other chief.' " Chief Justice Murray continues :6
"To assert the proposition that the President and Senate are above
the Constitution in this particular, and that they may do in this behalf,
what the President, and both Houses of Congress cannot do, would be
destructive of the government; for, under the cover of a resort to the
treaty-making power, every outrage and injustice which illiberality
can conceive, or fanaticism execute, may be perpetrated. . . .
. . . The power

.

.

.

must be

. . . limited to objects

which are the peculiar and proper subject matter of treaty stipulation.
"The exercise of this power under the Constitution, can scarcely
extend beyond that of declaring war, making peace, regulating commerce, and adjusting national misunderstandings or differences;

With the exchange of ratifications, a treaty becomes binding
upon the contracting parties in the international sense, whether
" Discourse on the Constitution and Government of the United
States, Vol. I, p. 203. Quotation by H. S. G. Tucker, op. cit., p. 5. See
also Emlin McClain, A Selection of Cases on Constitutional Law (2nd
Ed), p. 585.
anual of Parliamentary Practice, See. 52.
"Bsiemssen v. Bofer, 6 Cal. 250 (1856).
Ibid., at pp. 252-53.
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or not the treaty requires auxiliary legislation by Congress to
give it full force and effect so far as the United States is municipally concerned. One -exception- to this assertion imay be
noted, s8 when the treaty expressly or by necessary implication
provides that its binding force and execution shall be conditioned
by other auxiliary action-usually legislative, but occasionally
executive. 69
Charles H. Burr takes the position that "a treaty agreeing
to pay money is none the less a treaty, whether or no the money
be paid. It constitutes an executory contract and raises an obligation on the part of the United States to perform its contract."
If Congress should repudiate the obligation, '"the
power to make a valid treaty would be untouched by such repudiation; the United States would remain bound in international law. Congress, however, has never yet in its history re-

fused to recognize the obligation resting upon it, and it is unlikely it ever will.''70 Granted that, when completed, a treaty
becomes binding upon the United States in the international
sense, yet, contends James Parker Hall :1
"It is apparently the predominant opinion that treaty stipulations
requiring the appropriation of money, or the cession of territory, or
affecting the exercise of the power of federal taxation, or perhaps requiring the exercise of any governmental power other than that of enforcing and protecting private rights, do not become effective without
federal legislation. . . .
8As in the case of the Mexican reciprocity treaty of 1883, supra.
1 John Norton Pomeroy, in his Introduction to the Constitutional
Law of the United States, (10th Ed., Revised and Enlarged, by Edmund
Bennett), pp. 567-68, par. 676, declares that: "Some treaties are so
worded that, by their very terms, they apply directly to the subjectmatter. They do not stipulate for anything to be done in the future;
their provisions are not -promissory; but they declare that a certain
thing, state, condition, or right does thereby exist. Other treaties are
wholly or partly executory; they agree that a certain thing shall be
done. In regard to the first class, they are of themselves law; binding
as such upon all public officers, and upon all private persons. In regard
to the second class, they are, as such, binding only upon the government, and require legislative or executive acts, as the case may be, to
render them operative. As there is no possible manner of forcing Congress t6 pass a law carrying out the provisions of such a merely promissory convention, the only remedy which the other high contracting
party would have, for the neglect or refusal of the legislature to perform
its stipulated duty, would be to treat the neglect or refusal as a breach
of the treaty, and a good cause of war. That it would be sufficient
ground for war, according to the settled rules of international law, -cannot for a moment be doubted."
"oBurr, op. cit., p. 292.
"Cases on Constitutional Law, With Supplement, 1926, p. 967, note
4. But compare" with the dissent of Justice Field in Chew Heong v. U.
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T E HOUSE, TREATIS, AN) THE "SUPR-i

LAW OP Tm LAND"

Article VI, Clause 2, of the Constitution provides that theConstitution, laws "made in pursuance thereof," and treaties
made "under the authority of the United States; shall be the
supreme law of the land.
"
The question then arises,
-- when is a treaty made under the authority of tke United
States, aid. when, therefore,' does it become the supreme law of
the land ?72 And in case of conflict between a law of Congress
and a treaty, which takes precedence over the other?
During the course of the House controversy on the subject
of the Jay Treaty, 1796, Edward Livingston, member from New
York, offered the novel, although untenable, suggestion that the
order of enumeration of the supreme law clause was indicative
of the authority which should be given to the three instruments.
That is to say, the Constitution should be considered as supreme
over both laws and treaties, and in turn a law should be superior
to a treaty, since treaties are last named in the enumeration.
Livingston proceeded to argue from this premise that the legislature was superior to the treaty-making power, as represented
by the President and the Senate.YS
It has also been asserted that a treaty, being a bilateral or
multilateral international compact, should, in case of conflict,
have preference over a law of Congress, which is a unilateral,
municipal act; and that a treaty, once made, could be change
or abrogated only by the same power that created it. 74 Although
the courts have repeatedly overruled the contention, Justice
H., 112 U. S. 536, 562-63 (1884), post. -On the other hand, Everett P.
Wheeler maintains "that a treaty, when made by the President of the
United States and ratified by the Senate, is binding upon every resident of the United States and every citizen of the Republic wherever
he may -be, and that the President and the Federal Courts are vested
with power to enforce the provisions of the treaty, and that it is the
duty .of Congress to pass all laws which may be necessary to carry these
provisions into effect." "The Treaty-Making Power of the Government
of the United States In Its International Aspect," 17 Yale Law Jornal
151-61, at p. 151, (Jan., 1908).
"As!to the interpretation of the clause "under the authority of the
United States," found in Article VI, Clause 2, Justice Curtis held that
it meant not only the President and Senate In the power, but "with the
sanction of that law which is necessary to carry the treaty into effect."
Taylor v. Mortoi, 23 Fed. 784, case No. 13,799, (1855). Affirmed, on
appeal, in 2 Black 481. Cited in House Reports, No. 4177, 49th Cong,
2nd sess., Vol. II, p. 19.
3Annals, V: 631-32.
" See brief of Joseph H. Choate and J. Hubley Ashton for the appellant in Fong Ynac Ting v. U. S., 149 U.-S. 698 (1893).
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Catron, in his opinion in the Dred Scott cas% maintained that a
subsequent law of Congress-the Missouri Compromise Act of
1820-was invalid because it conflicted with provisions of the
Louisiana Purchase treaty of 1803. 7 5
Justice Curtis, sitting on circuit, pointed out that the Constitutioii does not settle the matter of conflict between a treaty
and a statute. Article VI,Clause 2, makes treaties a part of the
municipal law, and gives them no particular degree of precedence, nor does it state whether treaties shall be paramount to
laws already enacted.7 6
The position has been advanced, upon occasion, that if a
treaty cannot be put into full force and effect without the aid
of auxiliary legislative action, then, according to the wording of
the supreme law clause, the legislative act and not the treaty
constitutes the "supreme law of the land.' '77 If such a position
can be substantiated, then the fundamental question to be determined in all cases is whether or not,the treaty is self-executing.7 8
On a related point, the court held, in Turner v. American Baptist Missionary Uinion,79 that a treaty is the supreme law of the
land only when the treaty-making power can carry it into effect,
11Said Justice Catron, "My opinion is that the third article of the
treaty of 1803, ceding Louisiana to the United States, stands protected
by the Constitution, and cannot be repealed by Congress." Drea Scott
v. Sanford, 19 Howard 393, 526-28. Theodore Clark Smith declares
Justice Catron's position to be one "wholly foreign to American constitutional law." Parties and Slavery, 1850-1859 (The American Nation: A History, Vol. 18), pp. 201-02.
Pomeroy, speaking of treaties, op. cit., p. 118, takes the somewliat
hazardous position that "Their quality is so high that Congress can
only destroy them by a single act of legislation, namely, by a declaration of war against the nations with whom they are made." But what
of treaties whose operation is only suspended during periods of war,
and, again, of those which are not brought into full force and effect
until hostilities actually begin, as those regulating modes and operations of warfare? Pomeroy also speaks of the treaty-making power as
"this authority to pass laws which shall be supreme even over the
ordinary proceedings of Congress.

. . -. "

Ibid.

,1Taylor v. Morton, 23 Fed. 784, Case No. 13, 799 (1855). Affirmed,
on appeal, in 2 Black 481.
" See Chas. H. Burr, op. cit., p. 325, who indicates that such a contention cannot be successfully upheld. Burr gives a long quotation
from Chas. C. Pinckney, 1816, to substantiate his position, pp. 326-27.
" Compare Quincy Wright's article, op. cit., in 12 American Journal
of International Law, 64-96, at p. 82. For a recent case in which were
discussed the considerations governing when a treaty is self executing,
and when subsequent legislation is required to make it effective, see
General Electric Co. v. Robertson, (D. C. Md., Jul. 13, 1927) 21 Fed. (2d)
214. Discussed in 26 Michigan Law Review, 316-21 (Jan., 1928).
24 Fed. 344, Case No. 14,251, at pp. 345-46.
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and that when the negotiated -treaty calls for the payment of
money, it undertakes something that the treaty-making power
cannot do, because to give such treaty effect, the action of Congress is necessary. In this importaht ease the court said, in
80
part:
"A treaty under the federal Constitution is declared to be the
supreme law of the land. This, unquestionably, applies to all treaties,
where the treaty-making power, without the aid of congress, can carry
It into effect. It is not, however, and cannot be the supreme-law of the
land, where the concurrence of congress is fiecessary to give it effect.
Until this power is exercised, as where the appropriation of money is
required, the treaty is not-perfect. It is not operative, in the sense of
the Constitution, as money cannot be appropriated by the treaty-makIng power. This results from the limitations of our government.

The court went on t4 say that,81
"The action of no department of the government, can be regarded
as a law, until it shall have all the sanctions required by the Constitution to make It such: As well might it be contended, that an ordinary act of congress, without the signature of the president, was a
law, as that a treaty which engages to pay a sum of money is in itself
a law. And in such a case, the representatives of the people and the
states, exercise their own judgments in granting or withholding the
money. They act upon their own responsibility,and not upon the responsibility of the treaty-amacing power. It cannot bind or control the
legislative action in this respect, and every foreign government may be
presumed to know, that so far as the treaty stipulates to pay money,
the legislative sanction is required."

In the California case of Siemsen v. Bofer,82 Mr. Chief Justice Murray opined:
"The true rule of interpretation, in my opinion, is, that whenever
the treaty -embraces matters which are the subject of legislation by
Congress, it will require an act of legislation to carry the treaty into
effect; otherwise the House of Representatives is a useless appendage
to the political machinery of our government, and powers which are
expressly prohibited to Congress, or 'reserved to the States, may be
exercised through the instrumentality or omnipotence of the treatymaking power.'

The opinion of the California judge that "whenever the
treaty embraces matters which are the subject of legislation by
Congress, it will require an act of legislation to carry the treaty
into effect" has been supported upon numerous occasions by the
House of Representatives. The facts, however, do not always
bear out this contention, because, for example, numerous treaIbd.

" Ibid; italics are the writer's.
6 Cal. 250 (1856).
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ties regulating commerce have been put into effect without any
act of Congress.8 3 Justice Field,, in his dissent in Chew Heong
v. Us.iited States,8 4 took exception, to the reasoning of Chief Justce Murray, and argued that a self-executing treaty, even
though it relates to a subject within the power of Congress, "can
only be regarded by the, courts as equivalent to a legislative act."
Congress reserves the right, however, to modify the provisions
of the treaty or to "supersede them altogether" by a subsequent
act of legislation8 5
A few years later, in the Chinese Exclusion Case of Chae
Chan Ping v. United Stafes,8 6 the Court apparently had completely swung around to Justice Field's position, for it was held
that:
"If the treaty operates by it own force, and relates to a subject
within the power of Congress, it can be deemed In that particular only
the equivalent of a legislative act, to be repealed or modified at the
pleasure of Congress. In eith6r case the last expression of the sovereign will must control."

Charles H. Burr opines that the Court has repeatedly held
that a self-executing treaty has the force of a congressional act
even when the treaty relates to a subject generally considered
to be under the control of Congress, and hence requires no subsequent act of legislation to give it force and effect8T Burr,
therefore, takes occasion to criticize Chandler P. Anderson, who
had declared that it is still open for the Supreme Court "to hold
8 See opinion of Justice Field ii Baldwin v. Frankcs, 120 U. S. 678,
703-04 (1887), which states that under the right or privilege conferred
by treaty, "those who wish to engage in commerce enter our ports with
their ships and cargoes; those who wish to reside here select their
places of residence, no congressional legislation being required to provide that they shall enjoy the -rightand pr~vileges stipulated. All that
they can ask, and all that is needed, Is such legislation as may be
necessary to protect them in such enjoyment." (Italics are the
writer's).
- 112 U. S. 536, 562-63 (1884).
5Burr states that the whole court concurred with Justice Field on
this point, op. cit., p. 319.
-130 U. S. 581, 600 (1889); see also the holding in Geofroy v. Biggs,
133 U. S. 258 (1890).
"Burr, op. cit., p. 323. Compare with the practice in Great Britain:
"In Great Britain, for instance, a treaty is recognized as an engagement binding in honor upon the government, but the courts cannot
enforce it nor protect any rights which are claimed under it until
authorized to do so by an act of Parliament. If a treaty conflicts with
an act of Parliament, the statute always prevails." Quoted, with citations, by Lawrence B. Evans in his Leading Cases on American Constitutional Law (2nd Edition), p. 542, note.
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that no treaty dealing with matters entrusted to Congress is
self-executing."ss
"When either of the parties to the treaty engages to perform a particular act," writes .Pomeroy, "the convention addresses itself to the political departments of the government.
But it is pnly when the act stipulated to be done is legislative
under the Cbnstitution, that Congress must execute the contract;
when the act is executive in its nature, the President must
execute the contract."89
"Congress has no constitutional power to settle the rights
under a treaty or to affect titles already granted by the treaty
itself" except where the cases are purely political, for the
Supreme Court has held that "the construction of treaties is the
peculiar province of the judiciary." 9 0
Perhaps the leading opinion on this point is that given by
Chief Justice John ktarshall in Foster v. Neilson.9 1 The following doctrine was announced by the learned Chief Justice:
"A treaty is, in its nature, a contract between two nations, not a

legislative act. It does not generally effect, of itself, the object to- be
accomplished; especially, so far as its operation is infra-territorial; but
is carried into execution by thesovereign power of the respective
parties to the instrument. In the United States, a different principle

Is established. Our Constitution declares a treaty to be the law of
the land. It is, consequently, to be regarded in courts of Justice
as equivalent to an act of the legislature, whenever it operates of itself,
without the aid of any legislative provision. But when the terms of
the stipulation import a contract--when either of the parties engages
to perform a particular act, the treaty addresses itself to' the political,
not the judicial department; and the legislature must execute the con-

tract, before it can become a rule for the court."

POWER OF CONGRESS TO VIOLATE OR ABROGATE TR_. TIES; THE
RESPONSIBILITY ATTACHED TO SUCH ACTION

During our history there have been numerous conflicts lietween treaties and acts of Congress, and questions involving such
contradictions have often been adjudicated by the courts. Ih
the light of these decisions, there can no longer be any doubt as
to the power of Congress to violate or abrogate treaties already
" Chandler P. Anderson, "The Extent and Limitations of the
Treaty-Making Power under the Constitution," American Journal of
International Law, I: Part 2:636-71, at p. 654, (July, 1907).

Op. cit., p. 568, par. 678.

10Jones v. Meehan, 175 U. S. 1, 32.
612 Peters 253, 314 (1829). See also Senate Document, No. 154,
68th Cong., 1st sess., p. 547.
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in force. 9 2 And it hardly needs be said that the power to abrogate belongs to the political and not the judicial arm of the government. Neither is it for the courts to question the wisdom of
Congress in violating the provisions of a treaty. 93
Justice Curtis, on circuit, said in Taylor v. Morton that :94
"Inasmuch as treaties must continue to operate as part of our
municipal law, and be obeyed by the people, applied by the judiciary
and executed by the president, while they continue ufirepealed, and
inasmuch as the power of repealing these municipal laws must reside
somewhere, And no body other than Congress possesses it, then legislative power Is applicable to such laws whenever they relate to subjects, which the Constitution has placed under that legislative power."
"The foreign sovereign," said the court,95 "between whom
and the United States a treaty has been made, has a right to
expect and require its stipulations to be kept with scrupulous
good faith; but through what internal arrangements this shall
be done, is, exclusively, for the consideration of the United
States." The court declared that since Congress was given the
constitutional power to regulate foreign commerce, to lay duties,
and to make all laws necessary and proper for carrying these
powers into execution, "There is . . . nothing in the mere
fact that a treaty is a law, which would prevent Congress from
repealing it. Unless it is for some reason distinguishable from
92The question has arisen in some quarters as to whether or not
Congress abrogates a treaty. In referring to violations of treaties by
acts of Congress, the courts almost uniformly use the term "abrogate".
Hall says that "any treaty may be abrogated (Italics are the writer's)
by an act of Congress," but "treaties are not abrogated merely by a

violation of them by either party, unless the political authorities of the
other party elect so to treat them."

Op. cit:, p. 968, note.

But com-

pare Pomeroy, op. cit., p. 566, par. 674, "Congress having no power over
them, (treaties) cannot abrogate or modify them. In general, therefore, the President, with the consent of the Senate, may enter into any
species of treaty known in the intercourse of nations, any species known
to the international law." Wharton speaks of the adverse action of
Congress in 1798 as "annulling" the French treaties. Digest, II, Sec.
137a, p. 59.
"Repeals by implication are not favored, however, and the court
has, in general, held that the later action will not be regarded as repealing the earlier merely by implication. The two must be "absolutely incompatible" so that one cannot be enforced without antagonizing the other. Justice Peckham in Johnson v..Browne, 205 U. S. 309,
321 (1907). It logically follows, and Is now a settled rule of interpretation, that in case of incompatible conflict between a congressional
law and a treaty--"each being equally the supreme law of the landthe one last in date must prevail in the courts." Justice Harlan in
H~io v. United States, 194 U. S. 315, 324 (1904).
" 23 Fed. 784, 786.
" Ibid., p. 785.
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other laws, the rule which it gives may be displaced by the legislative power, at its pleasure." Justice Curtis explained that it
could not be maintained that the President and Senate possess
the exclusive power to fiodify or repeal the law found in a
treaty. If this were correct, the United States would never be
able to abrogate by means of treaty except with the consent of
the other party to the agreement. The court held that the Consitution did not pretend "to place our country in this helpless
condition."
Considering the general effect of war upon treaties, and
noting that Congress is given the power to declare war, the court
reasoned that it was not required by the Constitution that the
same persons who made the treaty should alone have the power
to repeal it. As to the constitutional power of Congress to regulate commerce and to levy duties, the court held that perhaps
to a certain extent these powers were supposed to be exercised in
conformance with existing treaties, but certainly not under all
circumstances. War, then, certainly was not the only mode of
escape from an existing treaty. The power "to refuse to execute
a treaty . . . is prerogative, of which no nation can be deprived, without deeply affecting its independence," and Justice
Curtis concluded that he had no doubt that the power to abrogate belongs to Congress. 96
0Ibid., pp. 784-86. The Court applied much the same reasoning
in U. S. v. Tobacco Factory,28 Fed. 195, Case No. 16, 528 (1870), where
it was held that Congress may abrogate a treaty in so far as it constitutes a municipal law, provided its subject matter is within the legislative power of Congress. Affirmed in The Cherokee Tobacco, 11 Wall.
616 (1871), where the Court declared, at p. 621, that a treaty may
supersede a prior act of Congress, (cited Foster v. Neilson), and that

an act of Congress may supersede a prior treaty, (cited Taylor v. Morton); and "if a wrong has been done the power of redress is with Congress, not with the judiciary, and that body,-upon being applied to, it
is to be presumed, will promptly give the proper relief."
Approved also in Ropes v. Clinch, 20 Fed. 1171, Case No. 12,041,
where the court declared that it could not inquire whether Congress, in
passing the contradictory act, had or had not an Intention to pass a
law Inconsistent with the provisions of the treaty.
Approved also in Head Money Cases, 112 U. S. 580 (1884); Whitney
v. Robertson, 124 U. S. 190, 194 (1888); fhae Chan Ping v. U. S. (Chinese
Exclusion Cases) 130 U. S. 581; Fong Yue Ting v. U. S. (Chinese Deportation Cases) 149 U. S. 698 (1893); La Abra Silver Mining Co. v.
U. S., 175 U. S. 423 (1899); Rainey v. U. S., 232 U. S. 310 (1914); and
others. The argument for the appellants In several of these cases was
that the determining factor should be the intent of Congress, i. e., that
by its action, Congress did not intend to annul the provisions of a
prior treaty.
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In the Head Money (ases, 97 Mr. Justice Miller in what
Evans considers an "admirable exposition of the position of
treaties in American constitutional law,"988 declared that there
was nothing in the essential character of an existing treaty
which gives it a "superior sanctity" over a subsequent law of
Congress. Pointing out that treaties are made by the President
and Senate, whereas these two agencies plus the Hbuse of Representatives were required to make a law, the Court held that if
there be any difference in their respective sanctity, "it would
seem to be in favor of an act in which all three of the bodies participate," and that a treaty must be considered, therefore, as
"subject to such acts as Congress may pass for its enforcement,
.modification, or repeal." As regards the matter of responsibility, however, the Court declared that the infraction of the
treaty "becomes the subject of international negotiations and
reclamations, so far as the injured party chooses to seek redress,
-whichmay in the eld be enforced by actual war." 99
This same fundamental question received somewhat elaborate treatment at the hands of the Court inthe Chinese Exclusion
Cases, 100 the decision in which constituted a "landmark in the
development of constitutional law in this eountry." 10 1 The cases
involved the Chinese Exclusion act of 1888,102 the treaty with
China of 1868,103 and the supplementary treaty of 1880,104 and
although here an unmistakable case of violation -was presented,
the Court upheld the statute on the oft-asserted ground that,
both being the supreme law of the land, treaties carried no paramount authority over acts of Congress. 10 5 The subsequent
'112 U. S.

80, 597-99 (1884).
B. Evans, op. cit., p. 542, note.
Justice Swayne, in The Cherokee Tobacco, 11 Wall. 616, 621, proclaimed that although the congressional act of abrogation is binding
upon the courts, yet the consequences that arise from such violation,
even though in the last analysis they lead to war, must be met by the
political and not by the judicial department of the government.
'100Chae Chea(n Ping v. United. States, 130 U. S. 581, 600.
'Herman W. Morris, op. cit., 37 American Law Review, 363, 371
(1903).
1 25 Stat. at L., 476-79.
'The so-called Burlingame Treaty, 16 Stat. at 'L., 739-41.
22 Stat. at L., 826-27.
"'After discussing the court's decision in the Chinese Exclusion
Cases, Everett P. Wheeler concluded that "This, after all, is holding
that it is within the power of a nation to violate its solemn obligations.
Such power exists, and must be reckoned with. But the obligation of
honor and duty remains." Op. cit., 17 Yale Law Journal, 161.
'Lawrence
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Deportation Act of 1892110 raised similar questions, but, as be107
fore, the congressional act was sustained.
The general rule of construction in such cases seems to be,
therefore, that when the treaty and the statute relate to the
same subject, "the courts will always endeavor to construe them
so as to give effect to both, if that, can be done without violating
the language of either; but if the two are inconsistent, the one
last in date will control the other, provided always the stipu08
lation of the treaty on the subject is self-executing."
So far as the writer is able to discover, on but one occasion
has Congress definitely, and in so many words, abrogated a
treaty, although the Chinese exclusion legislation constituted a
plain and unclothed abrogation of portions of the treaty with
China. Congress, by an act of July 7, 1798, after a recital of
the grievances held by this nation against France, declared that
"the United States are of right freed and exonerated from the
stipulations" of all existing treaties with that country, and "that
the same shall not henceforth be regarded as legally obligatory
on the Government or citizens of the United States."' 1 9 But,
whatever
as Wharton points out, "this annulling at .
might be its municipal effect, by itself could not internationally
110
release the United States from its obligations to France."
THE HOUSE AND THE BINDING FORCE OF REvENUE TREATIES

In accordance with the co'nstitutional stipulations providing
that all bills for the raising of revenue shall originate in the
House of Representatives, and giving to Congress the power to
lay and collect taxes and import duties and to regulate commerce with foreign nations, the House has frequently denied the
right of the treaty-making power, without the consent of the
national legislature, to make commercial or revenue conventions
infringing upon these powers and prerogatives. The House has
by resolution declared that the negotiation of such treaties without its consent and cooperation would constitute "an infraction
27 Stat. at L., 25-26.

"'Chinese Deportation' Cases, Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149
U. S. 698 (1893).
"$Justice Field In Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U. S. 190, 194 (1888).

1 Stat. at L., 578.
Digest, II, Sec. 137a, p. 59.
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of the Constitution and an invasion of one of the highest prerogatives" of that body.'1 1
The Tucker report of 1887 maintained that "it is absurd
to suppose that by the treaty power the President and the Senate
might enact revenue'laws and laws appropriating the money of
the people, through the agency of treaties, from all participation
in which the House was to be excluded, when, by the Constitution, to that House was exclusively confided the key to the
pockets of the people and the key to the door of their treasury."
To concede the power of the President and the Senate to interfere with revenue duties would cause a result "abhorrent to our
ideas of popular and representative government," and such a
,construction of the Constitution would prove "a stigma upon

the intelligent patriots who framed

it."112

Chief Justice Fuller, in his dissent in Downes v. Bidwe 1,113
declared that "it certainly cannot be admitted that the power
of Congress to lay and collect taxes and duties can be curtailed
by an arrangement made with a foreign nation by the President
and two-thirds of a quorum of the Senate."
Regardless of the fact that the courts have held that the
validity of a self-executing treaty is not affected because it concerns powers given to Congress under the Constitution, "not
only has the House uniformly insisted upon, but the Senate has
acquiesced in, legislation by Congress to give effect to such stipu" Crandall, op. cit., p. 196. See also the House Resolution of Jan.
31, 1902, calling upon the .Ways and Means Committee for an investigatiQn of the powers of the treaty-making departments in this field.
Cong. Rec. 35; Part II: 1178.
'u House Reports, No. 4177, 49th Cong., 2nd sess., Vol. II, pp. 13-14.
But see also House Report No. 225, 46th Cong., 3rd sess., pp. 1-4 (Feb.
14, 1881) where the House Foreign Relations Committee submitted a
report holding that there is no conflict between the revenue powers of
the House and the treaty powers of the President and the Senate. "All
bills for raising revenue" does not Include treaties-a treaty is not a
bill for raising revenue, and the requirement that "all bills for raising
revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives" Is not a limitation upon the treaty-making power, but is only a condition imposed
upon the ordinary law-making power of the government." The lawmaking power has nothing to do with the treaty-making power, "and
to require the consent of the House of Representatives to make a treaty
valid would violate the Constitution by making the House of Representatives a branch of the treaty-making power."
19182 U. S. 244, 312. Justices Harlan, Brewer and Peckham concurred In the dissent. See also the opinion of Justice White, with whom
concurred.Justices Shiras and McKenna, 182 U. S. 319.

THE HOUSE AND THE TREATY-MAKING POWER

lations.'114 And frequently "in case of proposed extensive
modifications a clause has been inserted in the treaty by which
its operation has expressly been made dependent upon such
action by Congress. "115
Prof. Quincy Wright gives as his conclusion that "Although
the competence of the treaty power has been clearly established
by practice, the necessity of congressional action to carry out
treaties affecting the revenue has usually been recognized, the
negotiated- instrument itself sometimes providing that it shall
not become valid until the necessary legislation has been passed.
With some dicta to the contrary, the courts have been inclined to
recognize such treaties as valid' and self-executing, though subject to any adverse action which Congress may subsequently
6
take.""l
In view of the holding of the courts, discussed supma, the
query may well be put as to the reason that there has not been
a more persistent conflict between the treaty-making power and
Congress on the subject of revenue treaties. Speaking of tariff
duties, Burr explains that "there is a natural resolution of
forces in favor of joint action by the treaty-making power and
by Congress. Party government.tends.that way; a sense of responsibility toward the people and of delicacy toward the other
contracting nation, would wish. to avoid any possible friction.
Today it has become a matter of almost legislative precedent,
"Crandall, op. cit., p. 195.
Ibid.
fOp cit., 12 American Journal of International Law, 68-69. Simon
Greenleaf Croswell concludes that it is plain " (1) That treaties of commerce were well known at the time of adopting the Constitution; that
it was well understood that such treaties might affect the tariff, and
that with this understanding the framers of the Constitution deliberately gave the treaty-making power to the President and Senate free
from any control of the House of Representatives. (2) That the clause
which provides that Congress shall regulate commerce and trade was
inserted to transfer this power from the States to the general Congress,
and has no direct or indirect bearing against the power of the Presi-

dent and Senate to make such treaties of commerce as they may see

fit. (3) That the -provision that all bills for raising revenue shall
originate in the House, does not apply to treaties. (4) That the provision which states that the treaties of the United States shall be the
supreme law of the land," was Inserted to prevent State laws from
nullifying the treaties, and has no application to any conflict between
a United States statute and a treaty. Which of those shall take precedence is a wholly different question .......
.. The Treaty-Making
Power under the Constitution," 20 American Law Review, 513-27, at
p. 519 (1886).
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that Congress shall fix duties when questions of reciprocity

arise. "117
Professor Wright has succinctly stated what seems to the
writer to be the correct conclusion on this point. Precedent
seems to require that treaties which alter the revenue laws shall
have "congressional cooperation for their execution" and
"while, even in these matters, Congress is under a positive obligation to act so as to give effect to a ratified treaty, yet the treatymaking power is under an equal obligation to consider, in connection with its view of international policy, the views on
domestic policy of. Congress, before finally ratifying ttie instrument. . . . An opportunity for Congress to pass upon
treaties of this charhcter before ratification would seem generally expedient though not legally necessary." 11 8
TREATIES AND THE

POwER op' CONGRESS TO DECLARE WAR'

In view of the prevalence of discussion concerning the Kellogg treaty providing for the outlawry of war, it seems pertinent
to examine the results of the adoption of this oiz similar treaties
providing for abstention from war under certain designated contingencies, upon the power of Congress to declare war. The
United States has, in the past, become a party to several treaties,
such as the so-called "Bryan Arbitration" treaties -of 1913-14,
whereby the contracting parties agreed "not to declare war or
begin hostilities" for at least one year, pending investigation and
report by an international commission.119 The question logically arises, as it did many times during the congressional debate
on the Versailles Treaty, whether or not the power of Congress
to declare war can in any manner be limited, not to say prohibited, by a treaty concluded by the President and the Senate.
The best opinion appears to be that Congress cannot be
finally deprived of its power to declare war by any means short
of the adoption of a 'constitutional axiendment to that effect.
The consequence of the adoption of such agreements as the
Bryan and Kellogg treaties is not to deprive Congress of its constitutional power to declare war, but rather to create an obligation to refrain from such action in certain contingencies. If

'"Burr,
op. cit., pp. 324-25.
Op.cit., 12 American

Journal of International Law, 82-83.
Charles G. Fenwick, International Law, pp. 416-17.
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Congress chooses not to be bound by the obligation thus created,
this nation may be subjected to such remedial action as the injured contracting party feels is commensurate with this country's breach of good faith.
Although war is declared by Congress, heretofore the
normal method of legally bringing a war to a &lose has teen by
treaties of peace. 120 Says John Randolph Tucker, "Some stress
is laid upon the power of a treaty of peace to repeal a declaration of war. It is conceded that this may be, but the reverse is
equally true. A peace by treaty today may be repealed by a
declaration of war tomorrow. Congress cannot create the status
of peace by repealing its deqlaration of war, because the former
requires the concurrence of two wills, the latter but the action
21
of one."1
There can be no doubt, as indicated by the authority just
quoted, that a declaration of war has very real results upon
treaties in effect between the belligerants at the moment of the
declaration. According to international law, some treaties are
terminated, the operation of others merely suspended, while
others are brought into their full force, and effect, by a declaration of war. The last statement by Tucker, however, carries significance in view of the passage by Congress in May, 1920, of
the so-called Knox Joint Resolution, by whose terms the declaration of war of April 6, 1917, was repealed. This attempted "unilateral termination of war" was vetoed by the President. If
such attempts by Congress prove successful in the future, the
effects of such action upon the treaty-making power in relation
1 22
to treaties of peace can only be contemplated.
CERTAIN MiSCELLANEOUS

CONSIDERATIONS'

23

One of the influences exerted by the House upon the President and the Senate about which little has been written is that
I" Judge St. George Tucker criticizes this constitutional arrangement in that it enables the President and Senate to "relinquish the
prosecution of the war" and the House Is given no, power "to prevent,
or retard the measure," in case that body thinks the prosecution of the
continue. Quoted by H. S. G. Tucker, op. cit, p. 7.
war should
It House Report No. 4177, 49th Cong., 2nd sess., Vol. II, p. 9.
See Fenwick, op. cit., p. 575.
03 If space allowed; at least three additional aspects of the question
might be treated:

(a)

The power of Congress in relation to treaties acquiring ter.

ritory. It would appear from the decisions in the Insular Cases that
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informal and intangible, but no doubt very real, political pressure which a concurrent branch of the national legislature may
bring to bear. Not only does the House as a body possess political means by which it may urge action upon the Executive and
the Senate, but the influence of the interplay of individuals m
and between the two legislative bodies, as well as with the President, must not be underestimated. Informal, personal persuasion by House members upon their colleagues in the Senate undoubtedly exists, although quite naturally such forces do not
appear in the record ! Influences of this sort, although practically -aloof from the process of measurement, cannot but exist
when two legislative bodies-politicians all--come together.
Then, of course, there is the ever-present weapon which may,
upon occasion, be employed by the House for the protection of
its interests and desires-the threat to refuse to give favorable
consideration to legislation proposed and supported by the
President or the Senate, or both.
Another force which does not lend itself to accurate determination is the practice in the House of not infrequently debating the merits of a proposed, or even of a completed, treaty, as
although it is well settled that territory may be acquired by treaty, yet
only by law of Congress can such territory be incorporated into the
United States. But compare Burr, op. cit., pp. 294-98. See especially
the opinions, concurring and dissenting, in DeLima v. Bidwell, 182 U.
S. 1; Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U. S. 244; also, Santiago v. Nogueras, 214
U. S. 260, 265.
(b) The Power of Congress over Indian treaties. Indian treaties
have no higher sanctity than other treaties, and "no greater inviolability or immunity from legislative invasion can be claimed for them."
The Cherokee Tobacco, 11 Wall. 616, 621. Acts of Congress admitting
new states to the Union repeal inconsistent provisions of existing Indian
treaties. See United States v. .cBratney, 104 U. S. 21, 623 (1881);
'Ward v. Race Horse, 163 U. S. 504 (1896); Thom-as v. Gay, 169 U. S.
264, 271 (1898).
See also Choctaw Nation v. U. S., 119 U. S. 1 (1886)
and Stephens v. Cherokee Nation, 174 U. S. 445 (1899). Also Indian
Appropriation Act of March 3, 1871, prohibiting, in general, further
Indian treaties, 16 Stat. at L., 544, 566.
(c) Extension of congressional jurisdiction through the exercise
of the treaty-making power. Under the provisions of Article I, Sec. 8,
Par. 18 of the Constitution, the courts have held that a treaty may
make Congress competent to pass legislation otherwise incompetent to
it. See opinion of Justice Harlan in Neely v. Henkce, 180 U. S. 109,
121 (1901). See Hall, op. cit., pp. 967-68, note, for a list of cAses in
point. Note especially the matter of migratory bird legislation, declared void In United States v. Shanver, 214 Fed. 154, and in U. S. v.
McCullagh, 221 Fed. 288; then upheld, under the terms of a subsequent
treaty, in Missouri v. Holland, 252 U. S. 416 (1920), where this subJect is discussed at some length by Justice Holmes.
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a part of the regular order of business. Can the Senate which
has under consideration a treaty be blind and impervious to a
House debate on the merits of the said compact? From the very
nature of the bicameral legislative system, it would seem ,that
it can not. These House debates, sometimes short, sometimes
prolonged at great length, are quite likely to occur whenever a
protocol of any importance has been, or is about to be, negotiated
or ratified. Only in the past two years, to make use of two recent examples, were remarks extended in the lower branch on
the subject of the Lausanne Treaty. 1 24 The record for 1927 also
shows, for example, that Representative Burton of Ohio made a
"comprehensive and very able appeal for the ratification of the
treaty now pending in the other body to eliminate the use of
poison gas in time of war between civilized nations.
."125
The House of Representatives has, of course, always retained and made use of its privilege to petition the President
by means of resolution, and not infrequently have treaty debates
in the lower branch been precipitated upofi the question of the
expediency of making certain requests of the Executive relative
to treaties.1 26 The use of the petition by resolution does not seem
to have diminished in recent years-a fact which may have some
bearing on the effectiveness of this method of approach by the
27
House.
During the first session of the sixty-eighth Congress, for
example, Representative Tucker proposed a House resolution
"requesting the President of the United States to transmit to
the House of Representatives a copy of the treaty between Great
Britain and the United States having for its purpose the abolition of smuggling intoxicating liquors from Great Britain into
Amerca. "128 During the course of the debate on the resolution,
it was contended that the treaty with Great Britain amended
the Volstead law which had been passed by Congress, and that
="Cong. Rec. 68; Part 2; 69 Cong., 2nd sess. (1927).
Ibid., p. 2088.

'As, for example, the House contest on the Jay Treaty in 1796,
which grew out of a resolution offered by Rep. Edward Livingston of
New York, asking President Washington for certain papers connected
with the negotiation of the compact. Annals, V:400-01:424.
'" In connection with the power of resolution, consider Pomeroy's
assertion that "The President must, of course, take the initiative in
making all treaties. Congress, as such, has nothing to say in the
matter." Op. cit., pp. 565-66.
1Cong. Rec. 65; Part 2; 1953. 68th Cong., 1st sess., (1924).
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in view of this circumstance, there was need for House action
upon treaties. The House, as a concurrent part of the- legislative power, should not be forced to stand idly by and see its
handiwork disrupted by the President and the Senate operating
through the treaty-making power. 1 29 However, the Secretary
-of State, in answer to the resolution, replied that it was not compatible with the public interest to furnish the House a copy of
the British treaty. z3 0 Unsuccessful in his first attempt, Representative Tucker shortly after offered another resolution questioning the..constitutionality of the treaty, upon which no action
appears to have been taken by the House. 131 During the same
session, Representative Connally of Texas proposed a resolution
requesting the President to send to the House a copy of the
treaty with Germany having for its purpose the abolition of the
smuggling of intoxicating liquors from Germany into this
country. 1 3 2

Two years later, Representative Berger proposed a joint
resolution "directing the President of the United States to call
-an international -conference for the purpose of revising the
term of the treaty of Versailles and to make public the secret
treaties pdrtaining to the cause of the World War now in the
archives of the allied governments and their associates.' 133
Several months ago, Representative Porter of Pennsylvania
oifered a resolution qf more consequence-a concurrent resolution "requesting the President to enter into negotiations with
the Republic of China for the purpose of placing treaties relating to Chinese tariff, autonomy, extraterritoriality, and other
matters, if any, in controversy between the Republic of China
and the United States of America upon an equal and reciprocal
basis." 184 In the course of the debate on the resolution, Representative Lineberger, holding Congress to be a legislative and not
an executive body, objected that the resolution savoured of Congress attempting to direct the President in foreign affairs.' 3 5
1109See

Rep. Tucker's remarks, ibid., Part 7, 6723-25.

Ibid., p. 6724.
=mIbid., p. 6931.
10 Ibid., Part 10: 10,242.

T Cong. Rec. 67: Part 4: 4325. 69th Cong., 1st sess., (1926).
ICong. Rec. 68: Part 2: 2195. 69th Cong., 2nd sess., (1927). The
full text of the resolution as amended by the Committee on Foreign
Affairs, is found, ibid., Part 4: 4386.
mIbid., pp. 4389-90.
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Representative Beedy questioned whether it was good policy to
give direction to the President considering the state of turmoil
in China at the time, 8 6 while Representative Chindblom did not
feel that it was "a proper action for the House to request the
President of the United States to negotiate a treaty," to which
remark the record shows applause 1137 Despite the objections,
the resolution passed the House' 38 and was sent to the Senate..
CONCLUSION
139
Henry St. George Tucker goes to much effort to prove
that in the contest between the treaty-making power and the
House of Representatives as to whether or not the House was
"bound as a slave to the chariot wheel of this great power" and
"the rights and duties of the House of Representatives as laid
down in the Constitution were suspended or eliminated in a servile obedience to its dictates.' 140 The House has substantially
come off the victor. Tucker asserts, after laboriously citing much
historical detail, that, with one exception, every President from
John Adams to McKinley has recognized the rights, influence,
and power of the House of Representatives by sending to that
body copies of treaties "which either carried appropriations or
effected changes in the revenue laws of the land, for their consideration and action."' 4 ' Regarding the powers and influence
of the House of Representatives, the author concludes that from
the time of the Jay controversy in 1796 down to the present
142
century,

"In the assertion and reassertion of its constitutional prerogratives, it has finally forced from tbose who contested their position the
admission that when an appropriation is carried in a treaty or the
revenue laws are to be changed by its provisions, that neither can be
attained without the consent of the House of Representatives, to whom
the Constitution has confided a share in the determination of
each. . .

Regardless of long-standing precedent and acquiescence,
one has only to turn the pages of the record of the debates and

"IOp.

cit., Chap. VIII.
Op. cit., pp. 235-36.
"'Ibid.,Part 4: 4355.
" Ibid.

1 Ibid., p. 4389.
lIbid., pp. 232, 236; see also pp. 6-9; 429.
mIbid. But compare Burr, op. cit., p. 292 and Butler, op. cit., ,
p. 428.
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of the resolutions offered in the House and Senate to discover
that all is not calm as concerns the present time-honored system
of treaty negotiation, approval, and enforcement. Representative Griffin, for example, has proposed in several recent sessions
of the Congress a "joint resolution proposing an amendment to
the Constitution taking away from the United States Senate the
exclusive power to ratify treaties and vesting that power in both
the Senate and House of Representatives,' '143 while Representative Edmonds proposed, in 1919, .a resolution asking for a report
from the Judiciary Committee as to whether or not the President and the Senate can negotiate treaties involving subjects
placed by the Constitution -within the jurisdiction of Congress.144 Similar proposals have likewise come from time to
time from private sources, as, for example, the statement of Professor Howard L. MeBain that "the requirement of the approval
of treaties by a majority of both houses of Congress would, it
would seem, better comport with the desideratum of democratic
control of foreign affairs. This is especially true in view of the
highly unequal constituencies from which senators spring.
. ",145 Suggestions have also been made concerning the
feasibility of taking the treaty-making power from the present
departments and lodging it in a- "Council of Foreign Relations. "146
But in spite of all proposals, whatever their source, there
must be a greater momentum than ever in the pa~t if the conmethod, of treatystitutional "Executive-plus-the-Senate"
making is to be modified to allow a share in the process to the
House of Representatives.1 47 The House continues to possess
an ever-potent gun behind the door, however, in its power to
virtually nullify the operation and enforcement of a treaty by
a refusal to vote the necessary funds for carrying its provisions
into effect. And although the House is firmly bound by the
Cong. Rec. 58: Part 4: 3292. 66th Cong., 1st sess., (1919).
"Ibid., Part 3: 3074.
151Howard Lee McBain, The Living Constitution, p. 199.
140 See letter by C. R. Thomas, "Back to the Constitution," concerning this proposal by Frank A. Vanderlip, in 9 American Bar Association Journal, 399 (June, 1923).
T For an old but good statement
of the arguments against direct
participation by the House in treaty-making, see Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States (5th Ed., by Melville M. Bigelow), II, Sees. 1510-18.
'
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force of precedent to appropriate any and all moneys asked for
by a treaty, the time may come when treaty differences of sufficient magnitude between the H4ouse on the one hand and the
President and the Senate on the other will cause the "Sword of
Damocles" of the House to fall in the form of a refusal of appropriations, and the firmly entrenched doctrine of "passive
approval" by the House will have been shattered.
As for treaties requiring auxiliary legislation in the form
of appropriations, Crandall concludes that "if the concurrence
of the House is necessary to the validity of the stipulation, its
actions should precede the final ratification; since the execution
of a treaty cannot with safety be commenced on our part, or be
requested of the other contracting party, if its validity is still
dependent upon the action of an independent legislative
body.''148 The mere fact that the question of House participation, or at any rate the question of freedom of appropriation discretion by that body, recurs so frequently, gives reason to conjecture that the practical fulfilment of the oft-enunciated doctrine that although "Congress is not a part of the treaty-making
department, neither are its legislative functions any part of the
treaty-making department,"'14 9 need occasion no stupendous
astonishment if achieved in future years.
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1 Op. cit., pp. 180-81.
1 John Randolph Tucker, Cong. Rec. 13; Part 7 and Appendix:
53. 47th Cong., 1st sess., (1882).

